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A Tour de Horizon of Issues on the Agenda of the 
Mercenaries Working Group* 
 
Gabor Rona**  
 
I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATION: THE DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN MERCENARIES AND PRIVATE MILITARY AND 
SECURITY CONTRACTORS1 
Despite the common use of the term mercenaries to 
describe private military security contractors (PMSCs) and the 
fact that in some cases PMSC employees meet the criteria of 
mercenaries, international instruments that govern mercenary 
activities do not normally apply to PMSCs. This is because 
employees of PMSCs do not usually meet the legal definition of 
mercenaries set out under the First Additional Protocol to the 
four Geneva Conventions or the International Convention 
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of 
Mercenaries.  
For example, 
 Although some PMSC employees are reported to have 
taken part in hostilities, the majority do not conduct 
combat operations; 
 PMSC employees are often nationals or residents of one 
of the State parties to the conflict;  
 PMSC employees sometimes operate within the military 
 
        *    The full title of the Working Group is “The Working Group established 
by the Commission on Human Rights on the use of mercenaries as a means of 
violating human rights and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to 
self-determination.” Both Mercenaries and Private Military and Security 
Contractors fall within the mandate of the Working Group. 
       **   Member, Mercenaries Working Group. This Article was prepared for 
the Minnesota Journal of International Law’s 2013 Symposium. To see a video 
recording of the discussion that took place, please see the Minnesota Journal 
of International Law’s website, http://www.minnjil.org/?page_id=913. 
 1. This section draws heavily from Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 47, 
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
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chain of command and are considered as members of 
the armed forces of the party to the conflict. 
In addition to international humanitarian law, human 
rights law provides protections both in armed conflict 
situations and when PMSCs operate outside the context of 
armed conflict.2 For example, human rights law would govern 
PMSC involvement in operations such as disaster relief or 
humanitarian aid situations that may also pose serious risks to 
human rights.3 
While PMSCs and their employees are not normally 
recognized as direct subjects of human rights law, States are 
obliged to take appropriate measures and to exercise due 
diligence to prevent, punish, and investigate human rights 
violations and redress the harm caused by human rights 
violations involving those caused by PMSCs.4 Although States 
are obligated to ensure that PMSCs and their employees 
respect both international humanitarian law and human rights 
law, this system has not proved effective in providing 
accountability for victims. In the last several years, we have 
seen various obstacles to accountability that suggest there are 
certain gaps at the international level that still need to be 
addressed. 
 
II. THE MERCENARY PROBLEM IN CONTEMPORARY 
CONFLICTS 
A. UPDATE ON RECENT ACTIVITIES OF MERCENARIES5 
The recent increase in mercenary activities in Africa serves 
as a reminder that mercenaries continue to pose a serious 
threat to the enjoyment of human rights. 
 
1. Use of Mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire 
Presidential elections were held in October and November 
2010 in Côte d’Ivoire.6 After some uncertainty about the final 
 
 2. See The Montreux Document, Sept. 17, 2008, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. This section draws heavily from Use of Mercenaries as a Means of 
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to 
Self-Determination, Third Comm., Rep. on its 67th Sess., ¶¶ 6–12, U.N. Doc. 
A/66/317 (Aug. 22, 2011). 
 6. Rebecca Blackwell, Ivory Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2011, 
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/ivoryc
oast/index.htm. 
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result, Alassane Ouattara was declared the winner of those 
elections in early December 2010.7 However, the outgoing 
President, Laurent Gbagbo, refused to concede defeat until he 
was arrested on 11 April 2011.8 For several months, he 
allegedly recruited Liberian mercenaries to consolidate his 
power base and attack the supporters of the President Elect. 
There were some reports that pro-Ouattara supporters had also 
recruited Liberian mercenaries.9 About 4,500 Liberian 
mercenaries were reportedly active in Côte d’Ivoire, mainly in 
the western part of the country bordering Liberia.10 
Since the election, there have been numerous allegations 
that Liberian mercenaries were involved in serious human 
rights violations, including summary executions, forced 
disappearances, rape, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, arbitrary arrests and detentions, arson, pillaging, 
and looting.11 Some mercenaries were reportedly arrested upon 
their return to Liberia.12 It is unclear, however, whether any 
mercenaries have been brought to justice in either Liberia or 
Côte d’Ivoire. 
The Working Group has taken the following actions in 
response to the situation in Côte d’Ivoire.13 On 19 January 
2011, it sent allegation letters to both Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia 
requesting further information on mercenary activities in Côte 
d’Ivoire, and on measures taken to prevent such activities and 
to hold those mercenaries involved in human rights violations 
accountable.14 To date, the Working Group has not received a 
response to its letters.15 
On 28 January 2011, the Working Group requested a visit 
 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Rep. of the Independent, International Commission of Inquiry on 
Côte d’Ivoire, Human Rights Council, Rep. on its 17th Sess., May 30–June 17, 
2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/48 (June 14, 2011). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Rep. of the Independent, International Commission of Inquiry on 
Côte d’Ivoire, Human Rights Council, Rep. on its 17th Sess., May 30–June 17, 
2011, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/49 (June 14, 2011). 
 12. See, e.g., Reuters, Ivory Coast Mercenary ‘Bob Marley’ Arrested in 
Liberia, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/15/ivory-
coast-liberia-mercenary-bob-marley-arrested (last visited Feb. 13, 2013). 
 13. See Communications Rep. of Special Procedures, Human Rights 
Council, Rep. on its 18th Sess., Sept. 12–30, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/51 
(Sept. 9, 2011). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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to Côte d’Ivoire. In this regard, the Human Rights Council 
acknowledged the standing invitation issued by President 
Ouattara to all special procedures mandate holders, including 
the Working Group on the use of mercenaries, to conduct visits 
to the country.16 The Working Group hoped to conduct such a 
visit by the end of 2011, but has not yet been able to do so. 
On 1 April 2011, the Working Group issued a press release, 
jointly with several other special procedures mandate holders, 
in which it expressed concern about the involvement of 
English-speaking mercenaries in attacks against civilians and 
recalled that the recruitment of such mercenaries is prohibited 
under international law.17 
The Working Group notes that there is increasing concern 
regarding mercenary activities in West Africa generally, and 
growing interest in developing a regional approach to this 
problem.  
In May 2011, President Ouattara called for such a regional 
approach, noting that many Liberian mercenaries who were 
active in Côte d’Ivoire had returned to Liberia, from where they 
may move on to Sierra Leone and then Guinea.18 The 
Secretary-General has also favored the development of a sub-
regional strategy for addressing the mercenary problem.19 On 
20 June 2011, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) called upon its member States to monitor 
movements across their borders, with a view to arresting 
perpetrators of crime and preventing mercenary activities.20 
On 30 November 2011, Laurent Gbagbo, the former 
President of Côte d’Ivoire, was transferred to the detention 
center of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The 
 
 16. See G.A. Res. 16/25, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/RES/16/25 (Apr. 13, 2011). 
 17. Press Release, Human Rights Council, Côte d’Ivoire: UN rights 
experts call on all parties to spare civilians and stop human rights violations, 
U.N. Press Release (Apr. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=1090
8&LangID=E. 
 18. See Ivory Coast: Alassane Ouattara Warns of Mercenaries, BBC, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13500677?print=true. 
 19. See Twenty-eighth Rep. of the Secretary-General on the U.N. 
Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, SCOR, ¶ 49, U.N. Doc. S/2011/387 (June 24, 2011). 
 20. See Press Release, Economic Community of West African States 
[ECOWAS], ECOWAS Commission Expresses Concern over Indiscriminate 
Movement of Weapons, Mercenary Fighters in West Africa, ECOWAS Press 
Release 104/2011 (June 20, 2011), 
http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=104&lang=en&annee=2011 (last 
visited Feb. 13, 2013).  
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Hague.21 Mr. Gbagbo was charged with four counts of crimes 
against humanity for acts committed during the post-election 
violence in Cote d’Ivoire.22 The acts forming the basis of the 
charges against Mr. Gbagbo were allegedly committed by the 
Security and Defense Forces,23 and reinforced by pro-Gbagbo 
youth militia and mercenaries.24 
Despite the removal of Gbagbo, mercenaries continue to 
pose a serious human rights and security problem in Côte 
d’Ivoire and their activities should be addressed in a systematic 
and comprehensive manner. Several reported incidents 
highlight this need.25 
On 13 April 2011, Liberian authorities captured the 
notorious Liberian mercenary, Isaac Chegbo (also known by his 
noms de guerre “Bob Marley” and “Child Could Die”), who 
allegedly helped orchestrate two massacres in which more than 
120 men, women, and children were killed in and around 
Bloléquin, Côte d’Ivoire, on 22 and 25 March 2011.26 Chegbo 
reportedly acknowledged that he had been hired as a 
mercenary to fight the new regular armed forces, the Forces 
républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire, as created on 17 March 2011, 
and to fight as a mercenary in support of pro-Gbagbo forces. 
Despite this admission, Liberian authorities failed to prosecute 
him and he was released on bail by the Monrovia Circuit Court 
on 1 February 2012.27 The Working Group notes with concern 
that despite the attempts of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia 
 
 21. Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and 
Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, Third 
Comm., Rep. on its 67th Sess., ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/67/340 (Aug. 30, 2012) 
[hereinafter Use of Mercenaries, 2012]. 
 22. Id. 
 23. The Security and Defence Forces were the former regular armed 
forces of the Gbagbo regime. 
 24. Use of Mercenaries, 2012, supra note 22 at ¶ 22. 
 25. Id. ¶ 23. 
 26. U.N. Panel of Experts on Liberia, Rep., transmitted by letter dated 
Nov. 30, 2011 from the Chairman of the Security Council Comm. Established 
pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003) concerning Liberia addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. S/2011/757; see also They 
Killed Them Like It Was Nothing: The Need for Justice for Côte d’Ivoire’s Post-
Election Crimes, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 2011), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/cdi1011WebUpload.pdf. 
 27. U.N. S.C., Letter dated Jun. 15, 2012 from the Chair of the Security 
Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1521 (2003) 
Concerning Liberia Addressed to the President of the Security Council, ¶¶ 62–
63. U.N. Doc. S/2012/448 (Jun. 20, 2012) [hereinafter S.C. Jun. 15, 2012 
Letter].     
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to obtain clarification, it remains unclear whether the charges 
against Chegbo were dropped or whether he was released on 
bail.28 
Next, in January 2012, Liberian police arrested 73 Ivorians 
and one Liberian national identified as a mercenary recruiter.29 
They were suspected of planning an attack on Côte d’Ivoire.30 
The report of the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia indicates that 
the County Attorney of Grand Gedeh did not properly 
investigate the charges and precipitously decided to release all 
74 detainees on 20 February 2012.31   
A third incident occurred on 24 April 2012, when a group of 
approximately 20 men attacked the Ivorian village of Sakré.32 
According to the UN Panel of Experts on Liberia, the attackers 
were Ivorians and Liberians aiming to create instability and 
loot property.33 Seven civilians were killed, two were injured, 
several houses were destroyed, and more than 3,000 civilians 
fled to villages nearby.34 The Forces républicaines de Côte 
d’Ivoire were able to capture four attackers, all of whom are 
Ivorian and all of whom are currently in custody.35  
The Working Group is particularly concerned about reports 
that armed militias, hostile to the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, 
recruited and trained Liberian children between the ages of 14 
and 17 to carry out cross-border raids.36   
In June 2012, seven UN peacekeepers were killed in Côte 
d’Ivoire.37 In its press statement on the incident, the UN 
Security Council expressed concern about the “prevailing 
insecurity in western Côte d’Ivoire and the border area, and 
continued cross-border movements of armed elements, 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. ¶ 67; U.N. Secretary-General, Special report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, ¶ 32, U.N. Doc. 
S/2012/186 (Mar. 29, 2012) [hereinafter Côte d’Ivoire Special Report]. 
 30. S.C. Jun. 15, 2012 Letter, supra note 27, at ¶ 67. 
 31. Id. ¶¶ 67–77. 
 32. Id. ¶ 78. 
 33. Id. ¶¶ 78–79. 
 34. Id. ¶ 80. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Liberia: Ivorian Government Foes Wage, Plot Attacks: Investigate, 
Prosecute War Criminals from Côte d’Ivoire Conflict in Liberia, HUMAN 
RIGHTS WATCH (Jun. 6, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/06/liberia-
ivorian-government-foes-wage-plot-attacks. 
 37. U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Security Council, Monthly Forecast: Jul. 2012, at 
24 (Jun. 29, 2012), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-
6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/July%202012%20Forecast.pdf. 
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including militias and mercenaries.”38 
So far no national strategy has been developed in Côte 
d’Ivoire or in Liberia to address the issues identified by the 
Security Council.39 The largely uncontrolled cross-border 
movement of armed elements, possibly including mercenaries, 
poses serious risks to the stability of the region, and to the 
human rights of the populations living in the border areas.40  
The Minister of Human Rights and Civil Liberties of Côte 
d’Ivoire met with the Working Group in March 2012 and 
indicated that his Government was prepared to receive a 
country visit. On 25 June 2012, the Working Group reiterated 
its previous request to visit Côte d’Ivoire by year’s end.41 
 
2. Use of Mercenaries in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya42 
Peaceful demonstrations by Libyan citizens seeking 
political change in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya began in 
February 2011. Within a few weeks, there were allegations that 
foreign mercenaries were being used by the Libyan authorities 
to violently suppress political protests. The Working Group has 
noted that this alleged use of mercenaries by the Government 
of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya departs from the traditional 
practices witnessed in the Twentieth Century and set out in the 
International Convention on the Recruitment, Use, Financing 
and Training of Mercenaries,43 adopted by the General 
Assembly in 1989. Traditionally, mercenaries have been 
recruited to either participate in an armed conflict or overthrow 
a Government. The March 2004 attempted coup in Equatorial 
Guinea offers an example of the traditional use of mercenaries. 
In the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on the other hand, mercenaries 
were not used to overthrow the Government: allegedly, they 
were used by the Government to quell civilian protests. Such 
 
 38. Press Release, President of the Security Council, Deadly Attack on 
United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, U.N. Press Release SC/10668 (Jun. 
11, 2012). 
 39. Côte d’Ivoire Special Report, supra note 29, ¶ 27. 
 40. Id. ¶ 25. 
 41. Use of Mercenaries, 2012, supra note 24, ¶ 30. 
 42. The following paragraphs draw heavily from U.N. Secretary-General, 
Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the 
Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, ¶¶ 13–20, U.N. Doc. 
A/66/317 (Aug. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Use of Mercenaries, 2011], & Use of 
Mercenaries, 2012, supra note 24, ¶¶ 31–38. 
 43. International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing 
and Training of Mercenaries, Dec. 4, 1989, 2163 U.N.T.S. 37789. 
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mercenaries were believed to have been recruited from 
neighboring African countries and, possibly, also from Eastern 
Europe.44 
In relation to allegations concerning the use of 
mercenaries, the International Commission of Inquiry, 
established in March 2011 by the Human Rights Council to 
investigate alleged violations of international human rights law 
in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, concluded that foreign 
nationals have taken part in the conflict, including 
perpetrating human rights violations, particularly on the side 
of Government forces. However, the Commission of Inquiry 
noted that there is some uncertainty about whether these 
foreign nationals meet the international definition of a 
mercenary. The Working Group agreed with this assessment. 
Further information is required as to how, when and for what 
purpose these troops were recruited. For example, the Working 
Group does not know whether the foreign nationals were 
resident in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya prior to their 
recruitment by the Government, whether they were engaged as 
part of an existing foreign military exchange, when exactly they 
were recruited and for what purpose (for example, to suppress 
the demonstrations or to take part in the subsequent armed 
conflict).45  
What is clear, however, is that where mercenaries have 
been involved in human rights violations against the civilian 
population, mercenaries must be held accountable.46 In 
response to the events unfolding in the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, the Working Group issued a press release on 22 
February 2011, jointly with several other special procedures 
mandate holders, in which it expressed grave concern about the 
alleged involvement of foreign “mercenaries” in the killing of 
protesters.47 
On 23 February 2011, the Working Group also sent an 
urgent appeal to the Government of the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya, jointly with several other special procedures 
 
 44. Rep. of the Int’l Comm’n Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of 
int’l human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 17th Sess., ¶ 194, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/17/44 (Jun. 1, 2011). 
 45. Id. ¶ 201.   
 46. See id. ¶ 192. 
 47. Press Release, Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Libya: 
“Stop the Massacre”–UN Experts (Feb. 22, 2011), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=1074
7&LangID=E. 
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mandate holders, in which it expressed concern about the death 
of civilians and the excessive use of force against protesters by 
security forces in the context of peaceful demonstrations. The 
Working Group requested, inter alia, detailed information on 
measures taken to ensure that foreign armed individuals were 
held accountable for any possible human rights violations. No 
response has been received to date.48 
The Human Rights Council held a special session on the 
situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 25 February 2011. 
The joint statement of special procedures mandate holders was 
delivered by the Chair-Rapporteur of the Working Group on the 
use of mercenaries.49 In the statement, the mandate holders 
expressed concern about the authorities’ enlistment of 
“mercenaries” from other countries to support the crackdown 
on demonstrators in Benghazi and other cities.50 
On 26 February 2011, the Security Council, in paragraph 4 
of its resolution 1970 (2011), decided unanimously to refer the 
situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court. Pre-Trial Chamber I of the 
ICC concluded that there were reasonable grounds for believing 
that three Libyan officials were criminally responsible for 
indirectly committing crimes against humanity (murder and 
persecution). Arrest warrants were issued on 27 June 2011. 
The Office of the Prosecutor has reportedly gathered direct 
evidence on the role of Saif al-Islam, son of Moammar Qadhafi, 
in recruiting mercenaries.51 
On 17 March 2011, the Security Council, in paragraph 16 
of its resolution 1973 (2011), spoke against the continuing flows 
of mercenaries into the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and called 
 
 48. U.N. Human Rights Council, Communications Report of Special 
Procedures, 58, A/HRC/18/51 (Sept. 9, 2011). 
 49. José-Luis Gomez del Prado, Chair of the Working Group on the use of 
mercenaries as a means of violating human rights and impeding the exercise 
of the rights of peoples to self-determination, Statement Delivered on Behalf of 
All Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council at the Fifteenth Special Session of the Human Rights Council on the 




 50. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the High Commissioner Under 
Human Rights Council Resolution S-15/1, ¶¶ 7, 17, A/HRC/18/51 (June 7, 
2011). 
 51. The cited material draws heavily from Use of Mercenaries, 2012, supra 
note 24. 
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upon all Member States to prevent the provision of armed 
mercenary personnel to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. Since the 
Working Group’s report of November 2011, Saif al-Islam 
Gaddafi, the fugitive son of Libya’s former head who had been 
accused of involvement in mercenary activities by the ICC was 
captured.52 In February 2012 the Security Council voted 
unanimously to refer the matter to the ICC, based on the arrest 
warrant that had previously been issued by the court. The 
Libyan Government rejected the surrender request. The 
Prosecutor of the ICC has asked the court to report Libya to the 
Security Council for failing to turn over Saif al-Islam. 
On 17 March 2012, Mauritania arrested the Gaddafi-era 
intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senouss. Al-Senoussi reportedly 
orchestrated the recruitment and operations of mercenaries in 
Libya. Mauritania has taken the position that it will conduct 
its own investigation before considering extradition requests 
from Libya, the ICC, and France.53 
Beyond the responsibility of high-level Gaddafi government 
officials for mercenary recruitment, a major issue that remains 
unresolved in Libya is the status of a number of foreign fighters 
who primarily came from other parts of Africa and who fought 
alongside the Gaddafi forces. In its March 2012 report, the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (established in 
March 2011 by the Human Rights Council to investigate 
alleged violations of international human rights law in Libya) 
reiterated its view that while it was clear that fighters of 
foreign descent fought alongside Gaddafi’s forces, it was 
unclear whether these fighters fell within the definition of 
“mercenary” under the UN Convention against Mercenaries or 
under the OAU Convention of Mercenaries. The main reason 
for this uncertainty was the “lack of information about the 
terms under and purpose for which they were contracted.”54  
Among the categories of fighters that the Commission 
found would likely not be categorized as mercenary were: an 
organized group of Sudanese fighters who were brought in by 
the Gaddafi government; a group of Tuareg fighters who were 
recruited from different regions of Libya; and various Libyan 
nationals or residents who were originally from Chad, Mali, or 
Niger.55 “The Commission of Inquiry also noted that the terms 
 
 52. Id. ¶ 32. 
 53. Id. ¶ 33. 
 54. Id. ¶ 34. 
 55. Id. ¶ 35.  
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‘foreigners’ and ‘mercenaries’ were used by the interviewees 
interchangeably to describe persons with dark skin who had 
taken part either in the conflict or in suppressing 
demonstrations against the Qadhafi regime.”56 
Although it is far from clear that the foreign fighters in 
Libya were in fact mercenaries, they are being held as 
mercenaries at various facilities around the country.57 The 
Working Group is concerned that, as reported by the 
Commission of Inquiry, thuwar forces have been involved in the 
arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance of perceived 
Gaddafi loyalists, security officers, alleged mercenaries, and 
members of the former government and detainees have been 
arrested without a warrant, without being told the reasons for 
their arrest, and without a reasonable suspicion that they have 
been individually involved in criminal activity.58  
“The Working Group is also concerned, that according to 
the Commission a number of detainees are being held outside 
any legal framework in unacknowledged centres.”59 Finally, the 
Working Group noted the concerns “expressed by the 
Commission of Inquiry regarding the conditions of detention of 
these fighters, including the maltreatment that is still taking 
place in centres under the control of local military councils and 
security committees and the fact that access to family members 
remains limited and that “access to lawyers is still not 
afforded.”60 
In order to examine the situation of those held as 
mercenaries and to provide the Government of Libya with its 
recommendations on how to address this situation, the 
Working Group has expressed its willingness to the 
Government of Libya to visit the country. As noted before, the 
visit was scheduled to take place from 21 to 25 May 2012, but 
the Working Group had to postpone its mission to a later date. 
The Working Group hopes to carry out its visit in 2013, as 






 56. Id. ¶ 36. 
 57. Id. ¶ 36. 
 58. Id. ¶ 37. 
 59. Id. ¶ 35.  
 60. Id. ¶¶ 36–37.  
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B. MERCENARIES: A RECURRING AND EVOLVING 
PHENOMENON61 
As exemplified by the attempted coup by mercenaries in 
Equatorial Guinea in 2004, mercenaries remain active in many 
parts of the world, and have devastating effects on human 
rights and the right of peoples to self-determination. 
Recently, rather than being hired to overthrow or 
undermine Governments, mercenaries have been employed by 
Governments to suppress opposition movements. The Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya is a prime recent example of where 
Government efforts to quash political protests became an 
armed campaign. It could be argued that mercenaries were 
used by the Government and implicated in human rights 
violations, thus impeding the exercise of the right of the people 
to self-determination. Such mercenary activities to support 
Government action against civilians demonstrate that 
mercenarism remains a significant threat to human rights. 
However, as noted by the Commission of Inquiry and 
highlighted by the Working Group, there is some uncertainty 
about whether these foreign nationals meet the international 
definition of a mercenary. More clarity is needed as to how, 
when and for what purpose these troops were recruited. The 
Working Group is concerned that although it is far from clear 
that the foreign fighters in Libya were in fact mercenaries, they 
are being held as such at various facilities around the country. 
We also note the concern expressed by the Commission of 
Inquiry regarding the conditions of detention of these fighters.  
 
III. THE LACK OF A BROAD ADHERENCE TO THE 
MERCENARY CONVENTIONS 
The above recent examples highlight the importance of 
combating mercenarism and mercenary-related activities. In 
this regard, the Working Group urged States to adopt national 
legislation to combat mercenarism and to ratify the 
International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries. As of 15 November 
2012, there were only 32 State Parties to the International 
Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training of Mercenaries, and 53 to the OAU Convention for the 
Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. 
 
 61. The following paragraphs rely heavily on Use of Mercenaries, 2011, 
supra note 42, ¶¶ 59–62. 
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IV. THE MONTREUX DOCUMENT ON PRIVATE MILITARY 
AND SECURITY COMPANIES 
The Montreux Document is a joint project of the Swiss 
government and the ICRC, detailing the legal obligations and 
offering best practices to ensure that private military and 
security companies operating in armed conflicts comply with 
applicable international law.62 Its approximately 70 
recommendations, derive from State practice and include 
verifying the track record of companies and examining the 
procedures they use to vet their staff. States should also take 
concrete measures to ensure that the personnel of private 
military and security companies can be prosecuted when 
serious breaches of the law occur. 
The Montreux Document was developed with the 
participation of governmental experts from Afghanistan, 
Angola, Australia, Austria, Canada, China, France, Germany, 
Iraq, Poland, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States, in 
meetings convened in January and November 2006, November 
2007, and April and September 2008. Representatives of civil 
society and of the private military and security industry were 
consulted.63 
The Working Group has welcomed this effort to clarify 
States’ commitments to international law and good practices, 
and considered the Montreux Document useful in recalling 
existing obligations of States under international human rights 
and international humanitarian law. In particular, the 
Working Group agreed with the principle, highlighted in the 
document, that although Governments may choose to outsource 
certain functions to private military and security companies, 
States retain their obligations under international human 
rights and humanitarian law. The Working Group believes, 
however, that the Montreux Document fails to address the 
regulatory gap in the responsibility of States vis-à-vis the 
conduct of such companies and their employees as it presents 
no assurance of enforceability of its good practices or the 
 
 62. The Montreux Document, 5, Sept. 17 2008, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0996.pdf. 
 63. The following paragraph draws heavily from The Montreux Document 
on Private Military and Security Companies, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS 
(Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/montreux-
document-170908.htm. 
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accountability of the endorsing States for the companies’ 
conduct.64 
 
V. THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT 
A. THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION AND CONTENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT 
Building on the foundations of the Montreux Document, 
which clarified the responsibilities of States in relation to the 
use of private military and security companies in armed 
conflict, the private military and security industry, with the 
support of the Government of Switzerland, developed the 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers in November 2010.65 The Code establishes a common 
set of principles for private military and security companies 
that commits signatory companies to provide security services 
in accordance with the rule of law, respect for human rights 
and the interests of their clients.66 
The Code of Conduct has proved popular with the industry 
and as of 1 February 2013, 594 companies had signed onto it.67 
While this is in itself a significant accomplishment, the process 
of translating the Code’s principles into enforceable practical 
standards (the Charter) has not yet been completed.68  
 
B. THE DRAFT CHARTER OF THE OVERSIGHT MECHANISM FOR 
THE INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE 
SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS  
On 16 January 2012, the Temporary Steering Committee 
of the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Service Providers issued the draft Charter of the Oversight 
 
 64. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Mar. 2, 2007–Mar. 27, 
2007, ¶¶ 42–48, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/14; HRC, 10th Sess. (Jan. 21, 2009). 
 65. International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, 
Nov. 9, 2010, available at http://www.icoc-
psp.org/uploads/INTERNATIONAL_CODE_OF_CONDUCT_Final_without_Co
mpany_Names.pdf. 
 66. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Sept. 12, 2011–Sept. 30, 
2011, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/32; HRC, 18th Sess. (Jul. 4, 2011). 
 67. See The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers Signatories Companies (Feb. 1, 2013), available at http://www.icoc-
psp.org/uploads/Signatory_Companies_-_February_2013_-_Composite_List.pdf 
(listing all the signatories to the ICOC). 
 68. See Explanatory Note on the Draft Charter on the Oversight 
Mechanism for the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service 
Providers, May 16, 2012), http://www.icoc-
psp.org/uploads/Explanatory_Note.pdf. 
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Mechanism for the Code for public consultation. As the 
implementing mechanism of the Code, the Charter’s structure 
and procedures have a critical bearing on the realization of the 
Code’s principles, goals, and rules. The Charter’s effectiveness 
is a litmus test for the legitimacy of the Code as a means of 
improving the adherence of private military and security 
companies to human rights standards.69  
The Working Group expressed its continued support for the 
process of developing the Code and the Charter as a means of 
improving the adherence of private military and security 
companies to international humanitarian and human rights 
standards. The Working Group recognized the challenges of 
developing the Charter and submitted extensive comments in 
an effort to improve the draft text so that it would better fulfill 
the promise of the Code to protect human rights in the context 
of activities of private military and security companies.70  
Generally, the Working Group believes that the Charter 
should be modified to explicitly mainstream the protection of 
human rights, which is the expressed goal of the Code and the 
Charter.71 The Working Group recommended that the Charter 
be brought further into compliance with the Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights developed by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises (Ruggie Principles72) which were unanimously 
endorsed by the Human Rights Council in its resolution 17/4.73 
That framework is specifically embraced in the Code and the 
Working Group believes the Guiding Principles set out the 
basic parameters that an industry self-regulatory mechanism 
should meet.74 The Working Group was aware of criticism75 of 
 
 69. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Sept. 10, 2012–Nov. 5, 
2012, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/43; HRC, 21st Sess. (Jul. 2, 2012). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. ¶ 21 
 72. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, May 30, 2011–Jun. 17, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31; HRC; 17th 
Sess. (Mar. 21, 2011) (advance unedited version). 
 73. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Sept. 10, 2012–Nov. 5, 
2012, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/43; HRC, 21st Sess. (Jul. 2, 2012). 
 74. Id. 
 75. For an example of civil society statement see Joint Civil Society 
Statement on the Draft Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
Jan. 2011, available at http://www.escr-
net.org/usr_doc/Joint_Statement_draftGPs_wendorsements-final-2.pdf. 
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the Guiding Principles, in particular by non-governmental 
organizations, but notes that such criticism does not concern 
the usefulness of the Principles as setting out the basic 
parameters for a self-regulatory mechanism such as the Code 
and Charter.76 
More specifically, the Working Group suggested several 
ways to strengthen the Charter. For example, it should require 
field audits. In addition, the third-party grievance mechanism 
established by the Charter should be revised to address the 
substance of third-party complaints (as envisaged in the Code) 
rather than focusing only on the procedural compliance of 
member companies. Lastly, the draft Charter contains 
provisions that permit companies to refuse to share information 
with monitoring mechanisms owing to contractual provisions or 
the potential for parallel legal proceedings. While the Working 
Group recognized the reasoning behind such provisions, it 
believed that the provisions present significant loopholes that 
could prevent the effective operation of Charter mechanisms 
and that the inclusion of such provisions reflects the inherent 
limitations of a self-regulatory mechanism, which can never 
replace accountability through the law.  
The Working Group welcomed the opportunity to 
participate in the public consultation on the draft Charter and 
hopes that its comments will assist the Temporary Steering 
Committee to produce a final document that lives up to the 
commitments made by the signatory companies to the Code. 
Nonetheless, the Working Group considered the Code to 
constitute but one element of an international system to meet 
the challenges of regulating PMSCs. As a voluntary and self-
regulatory tool, the Code by itself is clearly insufficient to 
ensure comprehensive accountability for violations of human 
rights and to provide remedies to victims. The Working Group 
believed that the draft Charter’s shortcomings illustrate the 
inherent limitations of a voluntary approach to regulation and 
demonstrate the need for a binding international instrument.77 
 
C. INDUSTRY–LED INITIATIVES 
The American National Standards Institute approved and 
issued in March 2012 its quality standard for private security 
companies. The standard, which built on the Montreux 
 
 76. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Sept. 10, 2012–Nov. 5, 
2012, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/43; HRC, 21st Sess. (Jul. 2, 2012). 
 77. Id. ¶ 23. 
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Document and the International Code of Conduct, aimed to 
provide requirements and guidance for a management system 
for private security providers with auditable criteria consistent 
with human rights, legal obligations and good practices. Those 
involved in the development of the standard have indicated 
that the goal is to undertake the process for becoming a 
standard approved by the International Organization for 
Standardization.78 
 
VI. THE WORKING GROUP’S EFFORTS TO COLLECT 
INFORMATION ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
A. RESEARCH INTO NATIONAL REGULATION OF PRIVATE 
MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES79 
The Working Group believed that it would be useful to 
study and identify legislative approaches regarding the 
activities of private military and security companies and to 
assess the effectiveness of national legislation in protecting 
human rights. Such a study would inform the Working Group’s 
efforts to demonstrate the need for a legally binding 
international instrument. In addition, it would assist in 
identifying best practices and may inform future projects to 
develop guidance for Member States seeking to regulate private 
military and security companies.80  
The Working Group has been conducting this work in 
phases. First, it analyzed national legislation that was easily 
accessible to develop preliminary conclusions on the models 
used by States. Second, the Working Group has initiated a 
survey to collect national legislation pertaining to private 
military and security companies. It has requested Member 
States to provide information in this respect and will 
supplement the information collected with additional research. 
Some of this research will be conducted in collaboration with 
civil society partners.81  
The Working Group will then analyze national legislation 
on a region-by-region basis The first regional analysis, which 
 
 78. U.N. Secretary General, Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating 
Human Rights an Impeding the Exercise of the Right of People to Self-
Determination, GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/67/340 (Aug. 30, 2012). 
 79. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Sept. 10, 2012- Nov. 5, 
2012, ¶¶ 24–26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/43; HRC, 21st Sess. (Jul. 2, 2012). 
 80. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Sept. 10, 2012–Nov. 5, 
2012, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/43; HRC, 21st Sess. (Jul. 2, 2012). 
 81. Id. ¶ 25. 
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will focus on Africa, will be included as part of the report of the 
Working Group to the Human Rights Council at its twenty-
fourth session, in 2013. The other regional analyses will be 
included in the subsequent reports of the Working Group to the 
Human Rights Council.82  
 
VII. THE USE OF PMSCS BY THE UNITED NATIONS 
Over the past year, the Working Group has, on several 
occasions, engaged in discussions with the United Nations 
Department of Safety and Security regarding the development 
of policies on the Organization’s use of armed private security 
companies. On 28 August 2012, the Working Group provided 
its written comments on the draft UN security policy manual 
on armed private security companies, the UN Security 
Operations Manual and the guidelines on the use of armed 
services from private security companies. It reiterated its view, 
expressed during its discussions with the Under-Secretary-
General for Safety and Security on 1 August 2012, that the 
framework could be strengthened by further mainstreaming 
human rights in the Organization’s policy and operational 
documents. The Working Group intends to conduct an 
assessment of the use of PMSCs by the United Nations in 2013 
and is planning to hold a consultation on this issue in the 
coming months. 
 
VIII. THE CONTENT AND REASONS FOR PROMOTION OF 
A NEW INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION 
A. SELF-REGULATION CANNOT ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF 
IMPUNITY 
 The International Code of Conduct signed in November 
2010 by a number of PMSCs in essence recognizes that these 
companies need standards. While the Code is an important 
initiative and the Working Group is hopeful that it will raise 
standards across the industry, it does not address the key issue 
of accountability. As a non-governmental instrument which is 
not legally-binding and is not backed by State sanctions, it 
cannot address the essential human rights issue of 
accountability for those PMSCs and their employees who 
commit human rights abuses. In addition, the voluntary nature 
of the Code of Conduct means that it cannot meet the goal of 
 
 82. Id. ¶ 26. 
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ensuring that all PMSCs are covered. 83 
 
B. NATIONAL REGULATION IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO ADDRESS 
THE PROBLEM OF IMPUNITY 
 Regulatory tools to monitor the activities of PMSCs are 
sorely lacking at the national level. Given the danger posed by 
the types of activities carried out by PMSCs and the types of 
environments in which they operate, at the very minimum, 
States should register and license these companies and 
regulate the types of functions that they can perform.84 They 
should also monitor their activities and ensure that they have 
the ability to prosecute where necessary in order to ensure 
accountability.85 Only a handful of countries currently have 
legislation that meets these minimum criteria.86 Even where 
national regulation has been adopted, it has serious 
limitations. The transnational nature of much PMSC activity 
means that some PMSCs can easily escape national 
regulation.87 Only an international convention could ensure 
that participating States apply minimum standards to regulate 
PMSC activities. Moreover, national prosecutions have rarely 
been successful because of the difficulty in identifying 
witnesses and collecting evidence abroad.88 In light of these 
limitations, the problem of impunity needs to be address at the 
international level.89 
 
C. CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW DOES NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF PMSCS 
 PMSCs, as non-State actors, are not subject to 
international human rights obligations. Moreover, employees of 
PMSCs, even in cases when they conduct mercenary-like 
activities, cannot usually be considered as mercenaries under 
the definitions set out in either the Geneva Conventions or the 
1989 International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training of Mercenaries.90 
 
 83. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, May 23, 2012–May 27, 
2012, ¶¶ 5-10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG/10/CRP.1; HRC, 1st Sess. (May 17, 2011). 
 84. Id. ¶ 26. 
 85. Id. ¶ 24. 
 86. Id. ¶ 26. 
 87. Id. ¶ 27. 
 88. Id. ¶ 28. 
 89. Id. ¶ 31. 
 90. Id. ¶ 8. 
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 Although States are obliged under international human 
rights law to take appropriate measures and to exercise due 
diligence to prevent, punish, investigate, and redress the harm 
caused by PMSCs, in practice that obligation is rarely fulfilled. 
In light of the current lack of accountability of PMSCs for their 
activities, it is imperative to enumerate the obligations of 
States vis-à-vis PMSCs in a legally binding document in a more 
explicated and detailed manner.91 
 
D. VICTIMS SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN EFFECTIVE 
REMEDY 
 In addition to the need to hold PMSCs and their 
employees accountable for their actions, victims of human 
rights violations involving PMSCs should be able to exercise 
their right to an effective remedy. Ideally, they should be able 
to do so locally. However, victims often live in countries with 
weak judicial systems. Even where victims are able to bring 
cases to the courts in the countries where PMSCs are 
established, such cases are rarely successful for the same 
reasons that criminal prosecutions often fail (availability of 
witnesses, lack of evidence, etc.). An international convention 
would reaffirm the right of victims to an effective remedy, 
create an obligation of mutual legal assistance and provide an 
international avenue for those who cannot exercise this right at 
the national level.92 
 There are some standards in international law applicable 
to the activities of PMSCs, but the regime is far from complete. 
First, although there are indications of strong disapproval of 
the involvement of private actors in combat activities, there is 
no clear international prohibition. Second, while it is clear that 
States have the general international obligation to ensure 
respect for humanitarian law and human rights vis-à-vis 
PMSCs, the content of such obligations has not been explicated. 
The Working Group believes that developing such content is 
critical for PMSCs because many of their activities pose 
particular risks for human rights.93   
 While the Working Group has consistently encouraged 
States to adopt national legislation to regulate PMSCs and 
believes such regulation to be essential, it seems unlikely that 
 
 91. Id. ¶ 19. 
 92. Id. ¶ 10. 
 93. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Aug. 13, 2012–Aug. 17, 
2012, ¶ 36, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.10/2/CRP.1; HRC; 2d Sess. (Aug. 6, 2012). 
RONA Article 5.1.13 5/21/2013  12:02 AM 
344 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT’L LAW  [Vol 22 
 
ad hoc efforts alone will be successful. Because PMSCs operate 
transnationally—they are often located in one country, recruit 
employees outside their home countries and deploy them in yet 
another country—it is not enough if only a few countries adopt 
legislation regulating their activities. So, although national 
legislation is a critical piece of the regulatory puzzle, an 
international convention serves as vehicle for making sure that 
such legislation is adopted by all the countries affected by 
PMSC activity and that the domestic legislation adheres to 
certain minimum standards.94   
 Finally, an international convention serves to highlight 
the commitment of the international community to address the 
issue of PMSCs. We often face situations where robust national 
legislation is vital and we use international mechanisms to get 
us there. For example, the attacks of September 11th 
highlighted the danger posed by terrorist attacks carried out by 
non-State actors. A critical part of preventing such attacks was 
to ensure that countries adopted and enforced national 
legislation.95 The route chosen was, however, an international 
one: the UN Security Council adopted a resolution to ensure 
that States passed legislation to control and criminalize their 
activities.96  
 For all of these reasons, the Working Group believes that 
an international convention is the most efficient solution to the 
challenge of regulating PMSCs.97 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The Working Group has expressed deep concerns about the 
alleged involvement of mercenaries in Côte d’Ivoire in killing 
and injuring civilians, the recruitment of children and in 
looting private property.98 It urged Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia to 
identify, arrest, and promptly prosecute the mercenaries 
responsible for violations of human rights and to take the 
measures necessary to prevent the recruitment and training of 
mercenaries, with special emphasis on children, on their 
 
 94. Id. ¶ 37. 
 95. Id. ¶ 38. 
 96. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 97. Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, Aug. 13, 2012–Aug. 17, 
2012, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.10/2/CRP.1; HRC; 2d Sess. (Aug. 6, 2012). 
 98. U.N. Secretary General, Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating 
Human Rights an Impeding the Exercise of the Right of People to Self-
Determination, GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/67/340, ¶ 28 (Aug. 30, 2012). 
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territories.99 The Working Group further requested the 
President of Côte d’Ivoire, in his capacity as Chair of the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic 
Community of West African States, to tackle the threats to 
human rights posed by mercenary activities in the sub-
region.100 
The Working Group has also expressed concerns about the 
measures taken by the Government of Libya against alleged 
mercenaries, their detention conditions and their rights to a 
fair trial. The Working Group urged the Libyan authorities to 
charge detainees being held in connection to the conflict for 
their involvement in specific criminal acts and to release those 
against whom there is no evidence of crime.101 It requested 
Libya to ensure that conditions of detention of persons accused 
or suspected of being mercenaries comply with applicable 
international law, including proper treatment of detainees, 
access to lawyers and family, and the ability to lodge 
complaints of torture and ill-treatment.102 
Given the risk to human rights of the activities of private 
military and security companies, the Working Group welcomed 
efforts by States to continue discussing the possibility of 
international regulation, in addition to the progress at the 
regional and national levels and industry-led initiatives. The 
Working Group is of the view that further research into 
effective national regulatory strategies is needed and called on 
Member States to respond to its request to collect all national 
legislation relevant to private military and security companies 
to facilitate analysis by multiple stakeholders.103 
The Working Group welcomed efforts to clarify obligations 
under international law and identify good practices, such as the 
Montreux Document, and industry self-regulation initiatives, 
such as the International Code of Conduct for Private Security 
Service Providers.104 It urged States to recognize these 
initiatives as complementary to, but no substitutes for, strong 
international and national regulatory frameworks. In the view 
of the Working Group a comprehensive, legally binding 
international regulatory instrument is the best way to ensure 
 
 99. Id. ¶ 70. 
 100. Id. ¶ 71. 
 101. Id. ¶ 72. 
 102. Id. ¶ 73. 
 103. Id. ¶ 75. 
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adequate protection of human rights. The Working Group 
therefore encourages all States to participate actively in the 
work of the intergovernmental working group established by 
the Human Rights Council with a view to considering the 
possibility of an international instrument for the regulation of 
private military and security companies. Finally, the Working 
Group encourages States to ensure the investigation and 
prosecution of violations of international human rights law 
involving private military and security companies, to guarantee 
accountability for human right violations and provide an 
effective remedy for victims.105 
 
 
 105. Id. ¶ 79. 
